State of EU-UK Diplomatic Relations
This session of the UK Trade and Business Commission saw witnesses give evidence on the UK-EU’s relationship, and the performance of UK ministers, negotiators, and diplomats.
There was a particular focus on whether the approaches that were adopted had delivered the best results for businesses and individuals, what could have been done differently, and the lessons that should take into current and future negotiations. The difference between being an EU member and third country, the views from the EU and how Britain's international diplomatic standing had been impacted were also be examined.
Witnesses
João Vale De Almeida, Ambassador of the European Union to the United Kingdom.
Nathalie Loiseau MEP, Former French Minister for European Affairs.
Terry Reintke MEP, Vice-Chair of the Greens/EFA Group in the European Parliament.
Lord Peter Ricketts, Former British Senior Diplomat and Life Peer.
Georgina Wright, Head of Institut Montaigne’s Europe Program.
Background Briefing
Written by Expert Adviser to the Board, David Henig (@DavidHenigUK)
There are many ways to think of changing UK-EU relationships over the last five years, and much has been written (there are links below to studies from the Institute for Government and UK in a Changing Europe). As a short introduction we can consider five significant changes:
From structured engagement to ad hoc arrangements
As EU members our officials and ministers engaged on a daily basis with their EU counterparts. EU business was a core part of the jobs of many of them. This did not have to be arranged, as there was a steady flow of scheduled meetings.
There were always informal visits outside of the formal structure, but these have now become the main way in which the UK engages with EU institutions of Commission (officials), Council (member states), and MEPs (Parliament). There are formal structures set up with the Commission under both the Withdrawal Agreement and Trade and Cooperation Agreement, but these meet only infrequently. Should there be a new negotiation this will be with Commission officials.
There are changes outside of the EU as well as within, for example UK diplomats are no longer part of cross-EU meetings in third countries or international institutions. Inevitably all of this means a lower level of contact between the UK government and EU counterparts.
From large member state to third country
As an EU member state the UK was one of the “big three” alongside France and Germany. In practical terms this meant that we usually spoke on all items of meetings alongside them, trying to achieve broad governmental aims. In general, our voice was important, and amplified through leadership of groups of like-minded countries, even if this could never mean getting our way on all issues.
Decisions on key EU issues such as major regulations, budgets, or key positions, are often decided in very long meetings of member states, often seen as ending with some sort of ‘fudge’. This does not however happen in negotiations with third countries.
EU negotiations with third countries are run by the Commission on the basis of a mandate from the Council, and views of the Parliament. Those two latter institutions must also agree to the final agreement. However, at no time does the third party get to sit round the table with members of the two institutions to formally negotiate, though they may try to influence informally.
From central to peripheral on issues relevant to member states
Given the importance of so many issues within EU competence to most countries (for example trade, economy, regulation), and the UK’s ability to influence these as members, it was important to seek our support. This would typically be part of the ongoing relationships within the EU where each member state is trying to build support for their objectives.
As a third country the UK is only occasionally of importance to EU member states. Neighbouring countries like Ireland and France are likely to have the most issues requiring UK cooperation, for many others there is little to which they would look towards the UK. Diplomacy and collective security of course continue, not least for those countries within NATO, and there are specific issues where the UK has more importance, such as financial services. However, the UK is no longer a key part of the objectives of most EU governments.
From shared space to informal inter-dependence
The UK has left a shared economic, regulatory and trade area, which all member states have involvement in maintaining. However, the extent of activity between the country and the EU, not to mention geographical proximity, means an ongoing relationship. Both sides will be keen to sell to the other, with an eye on relative strengths, such as UK services or the German centrality to European supply chains. Thus, there is continued interest on both sides on regulatory decisions, for example.
The UK has also increased its independence in the world compared to EU member states, and what we do with this is a source of interest to them. For example concerns about a deregulated ‘Singapore-on-Thames’ remain a concern, similarly what might happen to food regulations in search of a UK-US trade deal. Just as the UK government can seem ambiguous over whether it wants the EU to succeed or fail, similarly vice versa it is not clear to what extent the EU wishes the UK well.
From whole of UK government to Cabinet Office
The breadth of the engagement with the EU as a Member State meant that all departments were engaged to a significant degree, setting their own approach with loose coordination particularly of central priorities through joint work between the Cabinet Office and the Foreign Office. This changed in 2016 with the creation of new de facto roles of lead EU negotiator and lead EU minister, sitting in the Cabinet Office and reporting directly to the PM, and now both filled by Lord Frost.
Arguably this change reflects the transition of EU relations from technical to political in this period. This should mean that decisions truly reflect the priorities of the Prime Minister, however probably at the cost of failing to engage the whole of government, particularly in the kind of technical discussions which could help build relationships. It is interesting to reflect that both before and after 2016 the Foreign Office has not really led relationships with the EU.